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BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA: 
WARRANTLESS BREATH TESTS 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
SARA JANE SCHLAFSTEIN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota,1 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed privacy concerns related to necessary blood alcohol 
concentration (“BAC”) testing during DUI stops and arrests. To 
determine if these searches are constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court employed a balancing test, weighing the 
government’s interest in deterring and punishing drunk driving with 
the test’s intrusion on individuals’ privacy. The Court concluded that 
warrantless breath tests are constitutional when conducted incident to 
a lawful DUI arrest. 
This commentary discusses the case Bernard v. Minnesota,2 which 
was consolidated with another case into Birchfield. The Court’s holding 
applied to all three cases that involved the same question presented, 
but then discussed the applicability of its holding to each case.3 
Accordingly, this commentary first focuses on Bernard and then 
broadly discusses the Court’s holding. 
I. FACTS
This controversy arises from an incident that occurred on August 5, 
2012 in Dakota County, Minnesota.4 At around 7:00 PM, police officers 
were notified that three intoxicated men were attempting to pull their  
Copyright © 2017 Sara Jane Schlafstein. 
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1.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) consolidated with Bernard v.
Minnesota, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) and Beylund v. North Dakota, 859 N.W.2d 403 
(N.D. 2015).  
2.  844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).
3.  See infra Part V.
4.  Brief of Respondent at 2, Bernard v. Minnesota, (No. 14-1470) (2016).
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boat out of a river using a truck.5 When the officers approached the 
three men, they noticed an odor of alcohol.6 William Bernard 
(“Petitioner”), who was identified by two witnesses as the driver, 
admitted to the officers that he had consumed alcohol, but denied 
driving the truck.7 The officers, however, found the keys to the truck in 
Petitioner’s hand.8 They subsequently arrested Petitioner and informed 
him that refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol test is a crime under 
Minnesota law.9 Without securing a search warrant, the officers decided 
to perform a breath test to determine Petitioner’s blood alcohol 
content.10 Petitioner refused to submit to the testing and was 
subsequently charged with two counts of the crime of First Degree 
Driving While Impaired – Test Refusal in violation of Minnesota law.11 
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges in the District Court 
of Dakota County, Minnesota.12 Acknowledging that warrantless 
searches are generally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the 
trial court dismissed the charges and concluded that “because no 
warrant was obtained and none of the recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement apply, no lawful basis exist[ed] in this case to 
request submission to a chemical test.”13 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling.14 
The court found that, because the constitutional requirements for 
securing a warrant existed prior to the test request, the officers could 
have obtained a warrant, so the warrantless breath test was 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.15 
On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court affirmed the 
decision of the appellate court but on different grounds. The court 
stated that the appellate court’s reasoning was “contrary to basic 
principles of Fourth Amendment law” because “[a] warrantless search 
is generally unreasonable, unless it falls into one of the recognized 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 3. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Brief for Petitioner at 7, Bernard v. Minnesota, (No. 14-1470) (2016). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 2–3 (2014)). 
 12.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Bernard, (No. 14-1470). 
 13.  Id. at 59a. 
 14.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 3. 
 15.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 43a.  
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exceptions to the warrant requirement.”16 A search incident to a lawful 
arrest is one such exception. 
The court found that searches of an arrestee’s person during a 
lawful arrest are per se constitutional and require no further 
justification.17 Thus, the court concluded that, when conducted during a 
lawful arrest, a warrantless breath test does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because it falls under the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception.18 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”19 It further states that “no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things to be seized.”20 In general, a search is unreasonable 
if there is no warrant.21 The warrant requirement is however subject to 
exceptions.22 In United States v. Robinson,23 the Court provided one 
such exception, that a warrantless search may be conducted incident to 
a lawful arrest.24 When an officer makes a lawful arrest, she may search 
not only the body of the arrestee, but also the surrounding area and any 
possessions in the arrestee’s control.25 In Chimel v. California,26 the 
Court explained that this exception exists to protect an officer’s safety 
and to prevent the destruction of evidence.27 The search-incident-to-
 
 16.  Id. at 7a. 
 17.  Id. at 8a. 
 18.  Id. at 9a. 
 19.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 495 (2011).  
 22.  Id. In addition to the lawful arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception allows 
for a warrantless search when law enforcement does not have enough time to secure a warrant 
due to an emergency. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). The Supreme Court has 
determined that the natural and inevitable dissipation of blood alcohol concentration does not 
necessarily trigger the exigent circumstances exception. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 
(2013). The exigent circumstances exception must be determined on a case-by-case basis using a 
fact-based inquiry. Id. 
 23.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 24.  Id. at 235. 
 25.  Id. at 224. 
 26.  395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 27.  Id. at 763. 
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arrest exception is categorical rather than subject to a case-by-case 
analysis.28 In Robinson, the Court clarified that the fact that an arrest is 
lawful itself justifies “a full search of the person.”29 Accordingly, an 
officer does not need to assess the probability that the arrestee will 
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence in order to conduct a warrantless 
search upon a lawful arrest. 
In Riley v. California,30 the Court reaffirmed the categorical rule set 
forth in Robinson, and described how to apply the rule in modern 
situations, such as searches of cell phones, that were unfathomable 
when the Fourth Amendment was ratified.31 In such cases, a court must 
consider “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”32 Thus, the Court will 
employ a balancing test to determine if the government’s interest in 
conducting the search outweighs the intrusion on the arrestee’s privacy. 
B.  Minnesota’s Driving While Impaired Laws 
In 1961, Minnesota enacted an implied consent law to combat the 
dangers of drunk driving.33 As of 2014, the law states that “any person 
who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor vehicle within 
this state or any boundary water of this state consents . . . to a chemical 
test of that person’s blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of 
determining the presence of alcohol, a controlled substance or its 
metabolite, or a hazardous substance.”34 The act made consent to 
chemical testing upon arrest a condition of driving on public roads. 
Although the law allowed a suspected drunk driver to withdraw 
consent, such withdrawal would result in license sanctions for the 
driver. In 1971, Minnesota passed a per se drunk driving act.35 Under 
this law, the state no longer has to prove that a defendant is actually 
impaired while driving. Instead, a court will presume intoxication if a 
defendant’s BAC is above 0.08%.36 Because the per se statute can only  
 
 
 28.  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556. 
 29.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 30.  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 31.  Id. at 2484. 
 32.  Id. at 2478 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 33.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 1. 
 34.  Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subds. 1(a) (2014). 
 35.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 1. 
 36.  Id. 
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be enforced by determining a driver’s BAC level, the state 
subsequently made it a criminal offense “for any person to refuse to 
submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood, breath, or urine” when 
lawfully stopped by an officer for suspected drunk driving.37 
III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner asserts that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling is 
“shockingly wrong” in that “it untethers the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement from the 
exception’s rationale, while giving greater constitutional protection to 
an arrestee’s pockets or handbag than to the arrestee’s body.”38 
Petitioner agrees with the Minnesota Supreme Court’s dissenting 
opinion that the ruling “fundamentally departs from longstanding 
Fourth Amendment principles, and nullifies the warrant requirement 
in nearly every drunk-driving case.”39 
Petitioner claims that the Court has consistently explained that the 
purpose of the search-incident-to-arrest exception is to protect officer 
safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.40 Alcohol in the 
blood dissolves at a stable, predictable rate and is not subject to the 
control of the individual.41 Petitioner draws a distinction between the 
active destruction of evidence by the arrestee and the loss of evidence 
due to a naturally occurring process.42 According to Petitioner, only 
concern for the active destruction of evidence can constitute sufficient 
grounds for conducting a warrantless search under the search-incident-
to-arrest exception.43 Thus, Petitioner contends that the concern of 
alcohol naturally dissipating in the blood stream is not sufficient to 
justify a warrantless breath test.44 Additionally, a person’s breath 
cannot be used as a weapon that would cause harm to an officer.45 For 
these reasons, Petitioner argues that a breath test does not further the 
purposes of the search-incident-to-arrest exception and, therefore, a 
 
 37.  M.S.A. § 169A.20, subd. 2. 
 38.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 3. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12. 
 41.  Id. at 17. 
 42.  Id. at 11. 
 43.  See id. at 11–12. 
 44.  Id. at 17. 
 45.  Id. 
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warrantless breath test is not a valid search under the Fourth 
Amendment.46 
Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the search-
incident-to-arrest exception applies in this case because a warrantless 
search of an arrestee’s person is categorically valid during a lawful 
arrest.47 In Robinson, the Court stated that searches of an arrestee’s 
body incident to a lawful arrest are constitutional regardless of “the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence 
would in fact be found.”48 Following this reasoning, a breath test during 
a lawful arrest requires no justification of protecting officers or 
preserving evidence. 
Petitioner argues that this interpretation is a misreading of the 
Court’s intention.49 Petitioner asserts that the Court instead “ask[s] . . . 
whether application of the search incident to arrest doctrine to this 
particular category of [search] would ‘untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying’” the exception.50 Accordingly, Petitioner 
argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s “holding can fairly be said 
to turn Fourth Amendment doctrine on its head, and simply cannot be 
reconciled with this Court’s decisions.”51 The rationales of protecting 
officer safety and preservation of evidence must apply to searches of 
both the property and the person of the arrestee during a lawful 
arrest.52 Breath tests, as Petitioner explains, can never alone protect 
officer safety or preserve evidence, and, thus, it is a category of search 
that is not permissible without a warrant under the search-incident-to-
arrest justifications.53 
Petitioner further argues that there is no difference between a 
warrantless blood test and breath test in the context of a DUI 
investigation.54 The Minnesota Supreme Court drew a distinction 
between breath tests and blood tests, stating that the latter are more 
intrusive.55 Petitioner argues that the Court has “explicitly held that 
breath tests are searches for Fourth Amendment purposes.”56 When 
 
 46.  Id. at 13. 
 47.  Id. at 17. 
 48.  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014)). 
 51.  Id. at 17. 
 52.  Id. at 18. 
 53.  Id. at 21. 
 54.  Id. at 23. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989)).  
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weighing the privacy interests of an arrestee against the government’s 
interest in reducing instances of drunk driving,57 a breath test should be 
considered a “profound intrusion into a person’s bodily integrity.”58 
Rather than a usual exhalation of air, a breath test captures alveolar air 
from deep inside of the lungs.59 To collect this air sample, an arrestee 
must consistently blow air into the Breathalyzer for several seconds.60 
As further evidence that breath tests and blood tests should be treated 
similarly in terms of privacy interests, Petitioner points to different 
states’ treatment of these types of tests, asserting that most states that 
impose restrictions on the use of warrantless blood tests impose 
identical restrictions on the use of warrantless breath tests.61 
For these reasons, Petitioner argues that the warrantless breath test 
at issue here was unconstitutional, and accordingly, the state may not 
impose criminal penalties on an individual who refuses an 
unconstitutional search.62 Thus, Petitioner claims that the Court should 
reverse the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent argues that Minnesota’s test-refusal statute is 
constitutional because a warrantless breath test is permissible under 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Respondent begins the 
analysis with the notion that warrantless searches are generally 
considered unreasonable and thus are prohibited under the Fourth 
Amendment.63 There are, however, a number of well recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.64 The exception at issue here is 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception which allows an officer to 
search an arrestee’s person or property when the search is incident to 
a lawful arrest.65 Respondent argues that in Robinson, the Court 
adopted “the bright-line rule that police officers may, without a 
warrant, always conduct a full search of a person who has been lawfully 
arrested.”66 Rejecting a case-by-case approach, the Court stated that an 
 
 57.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89 (2014). 
 58.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 24 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 12, at 28a (Page and Stras, JJ., dissenting)). 
 59.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 24. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 25. 
 62.  Id. at 26. 
 63.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 8. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
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arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, and that any search incident to such arrest is permissible 
without further justification.67 Respondent contends that this bright-
line rule was later rearticulated in McNeely where, in addition to citing 
Robinson, the Court “recognized a limited class of traditional 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that apply categorically and 
thus do not require an assessment of whether policy justifications 
underlying the exception . . . are implicated in a particular case.”68 
Next, Respondent argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
correctly applied this categorical rule, holding that a warrantless breath 
test incident to a lawful arrest for DUI does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.69 Accordingly, because the compelled breath test is 
constitutional, the state may impose criminal sanctions on an arrestee 
for refusing to submit to the testing.70 Additionally, because the 
categorical rule applies, Respondent rejects Petitioner’s argument that 
because they do not further officer safety or evidence preservation, 
breath tests do not fall under the search-incident-to-arrest exception.71 
This notion, Respondent argues, cannot be reconciled with the 
categorical rule articulated in both Robinson and McNeely.72 
Respondent also rejects Petitioner’s argument that breath tests do 
not further the goal of preserving evidence.73 Because alcohol naturally 
dissipates in an individual’s blood, postponement of breath testing will 
negatively affect the test results.74 Respondent further argues that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was correct in drawing a distinction 
between breath testing and blood testing. In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives Association,75 this Court stated that “[u]nlike blood tests, 
breath tests do not require piercing of the skin and may be conducted 
safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of 
inconvenience or embarrassment.”76 Accordingly, Respondent 
contends that breath tests appropriately fall within the search-incident-
to-arrest doctrine. 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 10 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 n.3 (2013)). 
 69.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 10. 
 70.  Id. at 9. 
 71.  Id. at 11. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 12. 
 75.  489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 76.  Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 12 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625). 
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Respondent next argues in the alternative that “Minnesota’s test 
refusal statute is constitutional as applied to breath tests because a 
warrantless breath test administered to a suspect lawfully arrested for 
drunk driving satisfies the general reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment.”77 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all 
privacy intrusions, but instead prohibits only those that are 
unreasonable.78 When a categorical exception, as described in 
Robinson, does not apply to a certain category of searches, the Court 
will “balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related 
concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.”79 When 
employing this balancing test, the Court will examine a particular 
search by weighing the government’s interest against the degree of 
intrusion on an individual’s privacy.80 
Respondent contends that implied-consent and test-refusal laws 
effectively promote the government’s significant and legitimate 
interest in combating the dangers of drunk driving.81 The Court has 
repeatedly “recognized the costs of drunk driving as a substantial and 
compelling governmental interest.”82 Minnesota’s implied-consent and 
test-refusal laws have been effective in deterring individuals from 
driving while intoxicated and has lowered the rate of test refusal during 
lawful DUI arrests.83 Respondent maintains that the laws are also 
narrowly tailored to further the government’s legitimate interest 
because an officer is only allowed to compel a breath test when she has 
probable cause to believe that the arrestee is driving under the 
influence of alcohol.84 The application of implied-consent and test-
refusal laws is further limited because before imposing any criminal 
punishment, a neutral magistrate judge will dismiss the case if she 
determines that the officer lacked the requisite probable cause.85 Thus, 
Respondent argues that because the implied-consent and test-refusal 
laws  are  narrowly  tailored  and  effectively  further  the  government’s  
 
 
 77.  Id. at 13. 
 78.  Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 79.  Id. at 14. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 15; see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (noting the dangers with 
which drunk driving burdens society). 
 83.  Id. at 16. 
 84.  Id. at 19. 
 85.  Id. at 23. 
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interest in limiting drunk driving, they should be upheld by the Court 
as constitutional.86 
Respondent next explains that in Skinner, the Court found that 
breath tests constitute a lesser intrusion on privacy than blood tests.87 
Respondent explains that “the breath test itself simply requires the 
suspect to blow into a straw-like mouthpiece attached to the end of a 
tube that is connected to the [Breathalyzer] . . . anywhere from four to 
fourteen seconds.”88 Unlike a blood test, breath tests only reveal 
information about the amount of alcohol in an arrestee’s 
bloodstream.89 Thus, according to Respondent, the implied-consent and 
test-refusal laws at issue are a minimal intrusion on an individual’s 
privacy and should be upheld.90 
For these reasons, Respondent argues that warrantless breath tests 
during a lawful DUI arrest are constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment, and thus the imposition of criminal sanctions for test-
refusal is correspondingly constitutional. 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that “[b]ecause breath tests are significantly less intrusive 
than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement 
interests, . . . a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as 
a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.”91 As such, 
warrantless breath tests incident to a lawful arrest are constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court came to the correct conclusion in Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, upholding warrantless breath tests during lawful DUI arrests 
as constitutional. 
The Court began its analysis by examining the privacy interests 
implicated in breath and blood tests, finding that “breath tests do not 
implicat[e] significant privacy concerns.92 Analogizing the act as similar 
 
 86.  Id. at 17. 
 87.  Id. at 19. (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989)). 
 88.  Id. at 20. 
 89.  Id. at 21. 
 90.  Id. at 19. 
 91.  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016). 
 92.  Id. at 2164 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626). 
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to “blowing up a party balloon,” the Court reasoned that the physical 
invasiveness of a breath test is minimal because it merely requires the 
arrestee to blow into a straw connected to the testing machine for a 
period of four to fifteen seconds.93 As the Court explained, breath tests 
are only capable of revealing minimal information about the alcohol 
content in the arrestee’s breath, and the nature of the test it unlikely to 
cause heightened embarrassment for an individual during an arrest.94 
The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the test is intrusive 
because it requires the arrestee to provide a sample of aveolar (deep 
lung) air, stating that breathing is a necessary and common 
occurrence.95 The Court contrasted the privacy concerns inherent in 
breath tests with those implicated in blood tests, and determined that 
blood tests are more physically invasive because they require an 
unnatural piercing of the skin.96 The Court was correct in drawing a 
distinction between breath tests and blood tests. Because breath tests 
are minimally invasive, the privacy concern associated with warrantless 
searched are much less prevalent with breath tests than with blood 
tests. 
The Court then considered the government’s interest in obtaining 
alcohol content test results for individuals suspected of drunk driving.97 
The Court determined that “[t]he States and the Federal Government 
have a ‘paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety of . . . public 
highways.’”98 Drunk driving is a primary cause of traffic deaths and 
injuries.99 In addition to neutralizing the threat posed by drunk drivers 
who have already gotten behind the wheel, the government also has a 
compelling interest in creating effective “deterrent[s] to drunk driving” 
so that such individuals make responsible decisions and do not become 
a safety threat.100 
In its attempt to balance the government’s interest with individuals’ 
rights to privacy, the Court was correct in determining that the 
government has a strong interest in protecting the safety of citizens. 
Some searches without a warrant are necessary in order for the 
government to effectively keep its citizens safe, and the interest of 
 
 93.  Id. at 2176. 
 94.  Id. at 2177. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 2178. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)). 
 99.  Id. at 2178. 
 100.  Id. at 2179 (quoting Mackey, 443 U.S. at 18). 
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safety outweighs the concern of minimal privacy intrusion associated 
with breath tests, and thus, warrantless breath tests are constitutional. 
The Court then addressed Petitioner’s objection to considering 
breath tests under the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Petitioner 
argued that an officer can only conduct a warrantless search to protect 
the officer’s safety or to protect evidence from destruction. The Court 
rejected the distinction that Petitioner drew between active destruction 
of evidence and loss of evidence through a natural process.101 The Court 
stated that “[i]n both situations the State is justifiably concerned that 
evidence may be lost, and [Petitioner] does not explain why the cause 
of the loss should be dispositive.”102 Many Supreme Court decisions 
have recognized a state’s interest in preservation of evidence rather 
than merely preventing the destruction of evidence.103 
The per se approach adopted by the Supreme Court, which permits 
warrantless breath tests incident to lawful DUI arrests may be criticized 
as inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment because it effectively 
nullifies the warrant requirement in drunk driving arrests. The Fourth 
Amendment, however, only prohibits unreasonable searches. Because 
the government’s interest in protecting the safety of its citizens is so 
paramount, and because the method of testing is minimally invasive, a 
warrantless breath test during a lawful DUI arrest cannot be 
categorized as an unreasonable search. 
For practical reasons, the Court was correct in deciding that a 
warrant is not necessary for breath tests incident to a lawful DUI arrest. 
Requiring an officer to obtain a warrant for breath testing would likely 
encumber courts, adding to their already busy dockets. This could leave 
officers unable to obtain a warrant in time to effectively administer a 
breath test. Additionally, the implied-consent law is necessary to 
incentivize suspected drunk drivers to take the breath test. Without 
breath tests, officers and prosecutors would not be able to prove a DUI 
case due to lack of evidence. Before enacting the implied-consent law, 
penalties for drunk driving were greater than penalties for refusing to 
take a breath test. This provided an incentive for drivers to refuse to 
take the test in order to avoid the drunk driving penalties and instead 
settle for the less severe refusal penalties. As such, absent the implied-
consent law, drivers would be more likely to refuse testing which would 
 
 101.  Id. at 2182 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
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reduce the government’s ability to effectively monitor and punish 
drunk drivers. 
CONCLUSION 
While Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is designed to protect 
individuals’ privacy, it allows for warrantless searches under limited 
circumstances when the government’s interest outweighs the intrusion 
on privacy. A breath test during a lawful DUI arrest is such a 
circumstance. Thus the Court was correct in concluding that a 
warrantless breath test incident to a lawful DUI arrest is constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
